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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Silas B. Parks’s opening brief in this appeal was filed on 8 May 2017. The 
State’s response brief was filed on 1 August 2017. Mr. Parks now replies pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 35(c) which states in pertinent part, “The appellant . . . may file a brief in reply to 
the brief of the respondent . . . which may contain additional argument in rebuttal to the 
contentions of the respondent.” 
For clarity and for ease of reference, the contentions of the State to which Mr. Parks now 
replies will be addressed sequentially as they were presented in the State’s response brief. Each 
contention will be further identified by the appropriate page number of the State’s brief. Because 
Mr. Parks’s case was thoroughly detailed in his opening brief, and in the interest of judicial 
efficiency, only the nine points most in need of rebuttal will be addressed in this reply brief. 
REPLY TO RELEVANT ISSUES RAISED IN STATE’S BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
1. 
On the morning of the fire, Silas Parks attempted to call Sarah Parks via another person’s 
phone. The State’s implication that Mr. Parks lied about his effort to contact his wife is 
mistaken. 
At the top of page 2 of the Respondent’s Brief, the State asserts, “Authorities examined 
both of the Parks’ cell phones and determined that Silas did not, as he told the University of 
Idaho student, call Sarah that morning.” (Citation to preliminary hearing record omitted.) The 
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obvious implication of the State’s argument is that Mr. Parks lied about trying to contact his wife 
on the morning she died. The State is mistaken because it relies on an incomplete description of 
the uncontested evidence. 
During the preliminary hearing in the underlying criminal case, Detective Robert Marr 
testified that he examined the cell phone of Sarah Parks and that he determined there was an 
incoming phone call to her phone on the morning of the fire. R., Vol. V, p. 1029, L. 22 - p. 1030, 
L. 9. Detective Marr further testified that a person named Dan Schoenberg had called Sarah 
Parks at the request of Silas Parks on the morning of the fire. R., Vol. V, p. 1030, L. 15 - p. 1031. 
L. 7. Mr. Parks “had somebody call to try to find his wife.” R., Vol. V, p. 1031, L. 6. Thus, the 
implication that Mr. Parks was lying about trying to locate his wife via cell phone on the morning 
of the fire is contradicted by the same preliminary hearing record upon which the State relies for 
its assertion. Mr. Parks attempted to contact his wife by utilizing another’s phone because he did 
not have his phone with him. 
The same witness upon whom the State relies for its above argument, Stephen Malcolm 
Gillis, testified that Mr. Parks “did not have his cell phone with him at the time.” R., Vol. V, p. 
885, LL. 19-20. Further, Mr. Gillis testified that Mr. Parks was in the presence of Dan 
Schoenberg prior to the time that Mr. Gillis went to sit with Mr. Parks in a garage nearby the 
scene of the fire. R., p. 884, LL. 8 -12. Finally, Stephen Malcolm Gillis indicated Mr. Parks was 
distraught:  “. . . he was crying and he was saying things like they were going to uh close on their 
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house that day and find out the sex of their baby that day.” R., Vol. V., p. 885, LL. 9-12. 
Thus, it was reasonable for Mr. Parks to ask Dan Schoenberg to call Sarah Parks’s cell 
phone because of the urgency of the situation and because Mr. Parks did not have his cell phone 
with him. Then, minutes later, when Stephen Malcolm Gillis and Silas Parks were sitting 
together in the garage nearby the burning fire, because of the unusual and inherently stressful 
nature of the situation it would be reasonable (1) for Silas Parks to be imprecise in his use of 
language regarding his phone call to Sarah Parks, or (2) for Stephen Malcolm Gillis to have an 
incomplete recollection of the exact words Mr. Parks used in the conversation during which Mr. 
Parks was crying. Mr. Gillis’s testimony suggests imprecision, e.g., “[H]e was saying things 
like . . .” and not the more definite, “He said . . . .” 
It would have been unreasonable, and indeed suspicious, for Mr. Parks to sit coldly by 
while his home burned and respond to Mr. Gillis with practiced and thorough ease. It would also 
be unreasonable to expect a witness such as Mr. Gillis to have a precise recollection of all of the 
words spoken during a conversation occurring under such unusual and stressful circumstances. 
The State is mistaken in its implication that Mr. Parks lied to another about his effort to contact 
his wife when he came home and found his home in flames. 
/// 
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2. 
Mr. Parks did not provide a clear factual basis for the pleas of guilty at the 30 March 2010 
change-of-plea hearing by answering, “[T]hat’s what I did,” because he was responding to 
an amended information which had been drafted in the alternative and because the District 
Court then immediately asked the parties to stipulate to a factual basis. 
The State argues at p. 3 of its response brief that Mr. Parks provided a factual basis for 
the guilty pleas by responding, “[T]hat’s what I did,” when queried by the District Court. The 
question posed by the District Court to Mr. Parks was, “Tell me why you’re pleading guilty to 
those charges, Mr. Parks.” R., Vol. II, p. 291, LL. 2-3. Mr. Parks responded, “Because that’s what 
I did.” Id., L. 4. The Court’s use of “those charges” refers to the three charges in the amended 
criminal information filed on the day of the mediation and guilty plea. R., Vol. II, pp. 289-290.  
The flaw in the State’s argument is two-fold. First, the voluntary manslaughter charges 
contained within the amended criminal information are phrased in the alternative as to the cause 
of the death of Sarah Parks; the mechanism of death is stated as “strangling and/or suffocating”. 
R., Vol. IV, p. 807. As Dr. Arden explained at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, these are 
two different mechanisms of death caused by different causes of action. Tr, p. 52, L. 2 - p. 55, L. 
1; see also R., Vol. II, pp. 261-266 (Dr. Arden’s affidavit included in Mr. Parks’s 26 June 2013 
amended petition for post-conviction relief).  
If, for example, the amended criminal information had stated the cause of death as 
“shooting and/or strangling and/or poisoning” or “suffocating and/or bludgeoning and/or 
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stabbing” instead of “strangling and/or suffocating”, the flaw would be more apparent. 
Regardless, Mr. Parks’s statement was not a factual explanation of what acts he committed which 
constituted criminal conduct. Rather, his statement was that of a person acceding to the plea 
bargain process.  
Second, it is indisputable that the District Court did not consider Mr. Parks’s statement to 
have supplied a factual basis for the guilty pleas because almost immediately after the above 
exchange the District Court queried the Prosecuting Attorney as follows: “Mr. Thompson, are the 
State and the Defense prepared to stipulate to a factual basis in this matter.” R., Vol. II, p. 291, 
LL. 8-10. See also Appellant’s Brief, pp. 16-17. 
3. 
Mr. Parks did not waive review of the District Court’s error in dismissing the petition and 
in applying the Strickland standard. Mr. Parks expressly did not challenge the factual 
findings of the District Court. He clearly identified the issue as one of law only, and he cited 
the standard of review and requested a reversal. The cases upon which the State relies are 
readily distinguishable. 
In its waiver argument, the State asserts at p. 10 of its response brief, “Parks did not 
challenge any of the factual findings, legal standards utilized, or legal analysis conducted by the 
District Court.”  The State further asserts in footnote 4 on p. 10, “Therefore, even to the extent 
that this Court considers the merits of Parks’ appellate claims, it is bound by the factual findings 
of the district court . . . .” Respondent’s Brief, p. 10 (emphasis added). 
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The notion that Mr. Parks erroneously waived review of the District Court’s findings of 
fact is a straw man argument. The Appellant’s Brief states outright on p. 23, “This case presents a 
question of law, not fact.” Exhaustive legal analysis follows, concluding with “this Court should 
reverse the District Court’s final judgment . . . .” Appellant’s Brief, p. 46. It could hardly be more 
obvious that the only error asserted is a legal one, not a factual one. 
To support its argument that Mr. Parks waived review of the District Court’s application 
of the Strickland analysis to the undisputed facts of the case, the State relies on four cases: Akers 
v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428 (2014); State v. Hoisington, 104 
Idaho 153, 657 P.2d 17 (1983); Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 234 P.3d 696 (2010); and State v. 
Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 335 P.3d 597 (Ct. App. 2014). Respondent’s Brief, p. 9. The State did not 
address the facts or specific holdings of any of the cases upon which it relies, nor did it attempt 
to compare the facts of those cases to the facts of this case. A review of the State’s authorities 
shows that each of the four cases upon which it relies is readily distinguishable from the case at 
bar. 
Akers involved a multi-party real property dispute. In the portion of the opinion upon 
which the State appears to rely , one party challenged the District Court’s award of $1,760.00 to 1
repair road damage caused by the usage of tracked vehicles over a driveway. Akers, 156 Idaho at 
 The State did not provide a pinpoint citation for its quote from Akers, but this is the only 1
portion of the Akers case which matches the quote relied upon by the State in its brief.
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48, 320 P.3d at 439. The challenging party contended that the road had been historically used by 
tracked vehicles; however, that party did not provide any citation to the record to support its 
claim. Id. The Court held that it would not entertain the $1,760.00 challenge because the 
challenging party provided no citation to the record. Id.  
The Akers holding is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. The facts upon which 
Mr. Parks relied in his Appellant’s Brief are set out in great detail in pages 8 through 21 of the 
brief. Each assertion of fact contains a pinpoint citation to the record or transcript, as applicable. 
Those facts are then incorporated into the argument section of the Appellant’s Brief. This case is 
not at all similar to Akers because the facts have been addressed thoroughly, each with precise 
citations to the record. None of the citations to the record have been challenged by the State; all 
are accurate. 
The second case upon which the State relies for its waiver argument, Hoisington, 
addressed a direct appeal from a criminal conviction for two counts of rape and one count of an 
infamous crime against nature. Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 155, 657 P.2d at 19. During the oral 
argument of the appeal, Hoisington raised for the first time an issue regarding the admission of 
evidence by the trial court. 104 Idaho at 159, 657 P.2d at 23. The evidentiary issue raised during 
the oral argument was not assigned as error or briefed by either party. Id. The Court declined to 
address the issue for that reason. Id. Hoisington is readily distinguishable from the case at bar 
because (a) oral argument has not yet occurred in this case, and (b) the Strickland analysis was 
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set forth in detail in Mr. Parks’s opening brief.  
While it is true that the words “whether the District Court erred” were not explicitly 
stated in Appellant’s Brief, these precise words the State appears to be seeking were included in 
the context of the Strickland analysis both in the first Notice of Appeal filed on 1 June 2016 and 
in the Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 22 July 2016. R., p. 1281, paragraph 3.2, and R., p. 
1305, paragraph 4.2. Moreover, the Appellant’s Brief includes an identification of the standard of 
review, a statement that the review is only on a legal basis and not on a factual one, and a request 
for reversal of the District Court’s final judgment with specific requested instructions for the 
remand. Appellant’s Brief, pp. 23 and 46. The State had fair notice of Mr. Parks’s Strickland 
claim, and it has been clearly and fully presented, not waived. 
The third case upon which the State relies for its waiver argument, Liponis v. Bach, 
supra, involved a civil dispute concerning a trust and a joint venture to purchase real estate. 
Liponis, 149 Idaho at 373, 234 P.3d at 697. The quote upon which the State relies is taken from a 
section of the case where the Court discusses the apparently bizarrely worded statement of issues 
on appeal drafted by Appellant Bach. Id. at 374-375, 698-699. The Court described the 
statements and Bach’s subsequent arguments in its holding:  
These issue statements, filled with pseudo-legal hodgepodge and unintelligible 
verbiage, set the stage for Bach’s arguments. “Because an appellate brief is a 
communication, the writer typically seeks to be understood, in order that the writer 
may persuade.” City of Kansas City, Inc. v. Hayward, 954 S.W.2d 399, 401 
(Mo.Ct.App.1997). However, Bach “appears to believe the purpose of a brief is to be 
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obscure and esoteric.” Id. Accordingly, we will not consider Bach’s claims on appeal 
because he has failed to support them with either relevant argument and authority or 
coherent thought.  
Id. at 374, 698. Liponis v. Bach is readily distinguishable from the case at bar because the 
Appellant’s Brief contains relevant argument, relevant legal authority, and coherent thought. 
Fourth, the State also relies upon State v. Freitas, supra, for its waiver argument. Freitas 
involved an appeal from a Magistrate Court conviction for violation of a city ordinance related to 
the transfer of water. In the portion of the case upon which the State relies in the Respondent’s 
Brief, Freitas had argued on appeal that the water ordinance at issue was unconstitutional as 
applied to his conduct. 157 Idaho at 266, 335 P.3d at 606. Rather than arguing how the 
application of the law to him was unconstitutional, Freitas chose to argue the value of charity. Id. 
The Court held, “These assertions are unsupported by cogent argument or relevant authority 
applicable to the facts of this case.” Id.  Freitas, like Akers, Hoisington, and Liponis, is 
distinguishable from the facts of this case because in his opening brief Mr. Parks provided both 
cogent argument and relevant authority which was applicable to the facts of this case. 
Finally, it should be noted that what the State seeks by its waiver argument is a draconian 
remedy:  stripping a citizen of the right to appellate review because of a perceived procedural 
error by a lawyer. The State offers no explanation of how its waiver argument would further the 
administration of justice in the State of Idaho or enhance citizens’ trust that the justice system 
actually produces just results. The State does not explain how a waiver in this case would be fair. 
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Moreover, one of the cases relied upon by the State, Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., held 
that it is the substantial rights of the parties, and not minor errors, which are the paramount 
concern of the justice system: 
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court at every stage of the proceeding 
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties.” I.R.C.P. 61. Accordingly, although the district 
court applied an erroneous legal standard when deciding the Whites’ motion, 
because the photographs are merely cumulative, the Whites’ substantial rights 
were not impaired and the error will be disregarded. 
156 Idaho at 45-46, 320 P.3d 436-437 (emphasis added). In other words, the appellate court 
disregarded an error of the trial court because it did not affect the substantial rights of the 
litigants.  
A related principal is expressed in the current Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1(b): “These 
rules should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.” Of course, it is the Idaho Appellate Rules and not 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure which apply to this appeal, but the policy goals for the overall 
administration of justice are the same.  
A similar expression of public policy favoring adjudication on the merits of a case is 
found in Idaho case law. A finding of waiver is similar to an entry of default because it denies an 
adjudication on the merits. It is well settled in Idaho law that judgments by default are 
disfavored. “This court has long adhered to the rule that judgments by default are not favored; in 
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doubtful cases the tendency is to incline toward granting relief from the default and bring about a 
judgment on the merits.” Garren v. Saccomanno, 86 Idaho 268, 276, 385 P.2d 396, 401 (1963) 
(citations omitted). 
4. 
Had the jury trial occurred in the underlying criminal case, the burden of proof would 
have been upon the State to prove Mr. Parks’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State’s 
brief incorrectly implies that Mr. Parks would have borne the burden to explain his wife’s 
death. Mr. Parks had no motive to kill his wife, nor did he benefit from her death. 
The State argues at p. 14 of the Respondent’s Brief, “Indeed, attempting to theorize an 
innocent explanation for Sarah Parks’ death and the subsequent fire strains credulity.” It would 
not have been Mr. Parks’s burden at a criminal trial to provide an “innocent explanation” for the 
events. Rather, the State would have had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every 
element of first-degree murder and first-degree arson. This would have been a challenging 
proposition for the State because no witness observed Mr. Parks either kill Sarah Parks or set the 
fire, and because Mr. Parks had no motive to kill his wife, and because Mr. Parks did not benefit 
from her death. 
Being forced to rely entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the State would have faced an 
acute hurdle presented by the absence of motive. None is present in this case, nor is there any 
proof that Mr. Parks benefitted from his wife’s death (e.g., via a life insurance policy of 
substance). The record in this case contains the entire record of the underlying criminal case: 
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over 2,600 pages of discovery documents in PDF format and many dozens of digitized 
photographs, audio recordings, and video recordings. See Clerks’ Certificate Re: Exhibits filed in 
this appeal in February of 2017  and Exhibits 522, 523, 524, and 525 admitted without objection 2
at the evidentiary hearing (Trans., p. 299, LL. 9-13 and p. 300, LL. 15-19). With this plethora of 
information available to it, and having taken just shy of three months to draft its response brief, 
nowhere among these thousands of pages has the State identified a motive for Mr. Parks to kill 
his wife. The State has not identified a specific animus by Mr. Parks toward his wife or toward 
his unborn child, nor has it shown that Mr. Parks did not love them both. Also, the State has not 
identified a substantial benefit received by Mr. Parks as a result of his wife’s death. 
Even if the State had proven that Mr. Parks committed the arson, the occurrence of the 
fire by itself does not prove first-degree murder. Mr. Parks could have testified as to his religious 
beliefs and his hope and expectation that the fire would have caused a miraculous resurrection. 
See, e.g., R. pp. 128-129 and 171-172. More likely, Mr. Parks would have remained silent at his 
trial as the State struggled to present an entirely circumstantial case against a person of good 
character with no motive to commit a murder. Because the State would have borne the heavy 
burden of proof at trial, Mr. Parks’s prospects for an acquittal or hung jury were promising. 
Finally, the State emphasizes the importance of the arson as proof of murder, but that type 
 The copy which was provided to undersigned counsel as a part of the appellate process is not 2
dated.
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of argument is heavily dependent upon proving death by either strangulation or suffocation. Had 
the jury believed that the death occurred by strangulation or suffocation, that finding would 
provide a powerful motive for arson. The alternative theories of strangulation or suffocation were 
ripe for attack by a defense expert. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 12-16. Undercutting the 
strangulation-or-suffocation theory would have required defense expert testimony, and it would 
not have required the testimony of Mr. Parks, and it would have rebutted the State’s case against 
Mr. Parks for murder while at the same time severely undercutting the State’s theory as to the 
motive for arson. 
5. 
The State’s argument uses the hands-on-neck statement out of context. 
The State asserts, “Parks told trial counsel that he recalled putting his hands around 
Sarah’s neck and starting the fire.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 14. This is an oversimplification of 
what occurred, and it is taken out of context. This issue was discussed at length with pinpoint 
citations to the record in “The Hazy Recollection” section of Mr. Parks’s opening brief. See 
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 18-21. It should also be noted that the State cites page 549 of the Clerk’s 
Record, but at p. 548 of the Clerk’s Record, trial counsel made undated contemporaneous notes 
which included the statement by Mr. Parks, “I didn’t kill my wife.” R., p. 548, L. 24.  
Overall, however, the issue of Mr. Parks’s statements to his attorneys are too complex to 
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be resolved by cherry-picking lines from the record. This is the reason “The Hazy Recollection” 
section of Mr. Parks’s opening brief places the various statements in context. The State has not 
challenged Mr. Parks’s citations to the undisputed facts of this case in the Appellant’s Brief. 
6. 
To assert that defense counsel “consulted” two forensic pathologists strains the meaning of 
the word to the point of absurdity. It is undisputed that no expert opinion was obtained 
regarding the cause of death. 
The State asserts, “Trial counsel consulted two forensic pathologists about the case.” 
Respondent’s Brief, p. 16 (emphasis added). If the reader of the State’s brief did not have the 
benefit of the Appellant’s Brief or this reply brief, he or she would reasonably conclude that the 
defense lawyers obtained information about the case from two forensic pathologists. No 
dictionary definition is necessary to demonstrate that this is the reasonable and ordinary use of 
the word “consulted.” 
The undisputed truth is that Mr. Parks’s trial-level defense lawyers never obtained any 
opinion at all from any forensic pathologist. See the “Absence of Forensic Investigation by 
Defense Counsel in Underlying Criminal Case” section of Appellant’s Brief at pp. 10-12. While 
it is true that one of the lawyers contacted two forensic pathologists, no opinion at all was 
obtained from either. Id. To call this “consulting” is a misleading glorification of the actions 
actually taken by the lawyer. Even though defense counsel knew the Magistrate Court had relied 
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heavily on the strangulation or suffocation expert opinion in binding over Mr. Parks (see 
Appellant’s Brief, top of p. 12), and even though defense counsel knew how to locate and contact 
forensic pathologists, counsel entirely ceded this critical aspect of the case to the State. Defense 
counsel essentially adopted the State’s theory of the cause of death without investigating its 
validity. 
7. 
The State hired an attorney for the evidentiary hearing to provide the District Court with 
an “expert” opinion as to how to apply the applicable law to the facts of this case. The State 
relies on this testimony at p. 17 of its brief. It should be disregarded. 
At p. 17 of its Response Brief, the State relies upon the so-called expert testimony of 
defense attorney Paul Clark. First, it should be noted that in his 45 years of practice at the time of 
his testimony, Mr. Clark had taken precisely one murder case to trial in which the death of the 
victim was an issue. Tr., p. 289, LL. 3-12. In that one case, he hired for his client’s benefit a 
forensic pathologist (Id.), exactly what defense counsel in this case failed to do. His own conduct 
as a lawyer working on a similar case is more revealing than his paid opinion excusing the 
omissions of defense counsel in this case. 
More importantly, his opinion testimony should be disregarded because judges do not 
need expert testimony to decide how to apply the applicable law to the facts of a case. “A witness 
cannot be allowed to give an opinion on a question of law.... In order to justify having courts 
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resolve disputes between litigants, it must be posited as an a priori assumption that there is one, 
but only one, legal answer for every cognizable dispute. There being only one applicable legal 
rule for each dispute or issue, it requires only one spokesman of the law, who of course is the 
judge.... To allow anyone other than the judge to state the law would violate the basic concept.” 
Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.3d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). “[I]t is axiomatic that the judge is the sole arbiter of the law and its applicability.” Id. at 
807. 
The attorney expert testimony was admitted over the written objection of Mr. Parks. See 
R., Vol. IV, pp. 756-768 (motion in limine), 786-792 (response to motion in limine), and 793-794 
(court minutes). Because the Clark testimony played little role in the District Court’s findings 
and conclusions, this issue was not pursued in this appeal. As stated above, not every error by a 
trial-level judge affects the substantial rights of a litigant. Akers, 156 Idaho at 45-46, 320 P.3d 
436-437. Nonetheless, an attorney’s expert opinion should play no role in the decision of any 
case because, as the Specht court held, it is axiomatic that it is the province of judges alone to 
determine the applicable law and how to apply it. 
8. 
The State had ample time to develop its case against Mr. Parks; his plea bargain did not 
prejudice the investigation. 
The Respondent’s Brief asserts, “[T]he state’s evidence of guilt . . . was never fully 
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developed because the defendant chose to plead guilty and waive his right to require the state to 
prove its case . . . .  Parks ended the state’s investigation into the underlying crimes by pleading 
guilty.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 18 (emphasis in original). In essence, the State claims that it has 
been unfairly prejudiced by the current collateral attack on the guilty pleas because the guilty 
pleas themselves stopped the State from further building its case against Mr. Parks. 
This type of argument could hold water in some cases, but it does not in this case because 
of the timeline of events. In this case, the State had abundant time to investigate the case, and the 
plea bargain occurred shortly before trial. Sarah Parks died on 24 June 2009. R., Vol. IV, pp. 
802-803 and 812. The State’s investigation regarding the circumstances of her death began 
immediately. R., Vol. IV, p. 820. Seven days later, on 1 July 2009, Mr. Parks was charged by 
criminal complaint with two counts of murder in the first degree and one count of arson in the 
first degree. R., Vol. I, p. 87. Thus, the State was able to construct its theory of the case and make 
a charging decision in the space of one week. 
The plea bargain did not occur until the following year, giving the State abundant 
opportunity to investigate the alleged crimes and build a case against Mr. Parks. The mediation, 
plea bargain, and change of plea hearing all occurred on the same day, 30 March 2010. See 
Appellant’s Brief, p. 16. This was approximately six weeks before the jury trial was scheduled to 
commence. Id. 
Thus, not only did the State have over eight months to investigate this matter and build a 
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case against Mr. Parks, but also the State did not enter into the plea bargain until six weeks 
before the trial. Because over eight months passed between the charging decision and the plea 
bargain, and because the plea bargain occurred shortly before what would have been a very 
complex trial based nearly entirely on circumstantial evidence, the State’s investigation should 
have been completed by the time of the plea bargain.  
More specifically to the issues raised in this post-conviction action, the State had 
obtained its expert opinion from Dr. Reynolds on 26 June 2009, before Mr. Parks was charged. 
R., Vol. IV, p. 812. The State in this post-conviction matter could have hired an expert separate 
and apart from Dr. Reynolds, but it did not do so. 
The State has failed to show any specific prejudice resulting from the entry of the plea 
bargain. The claim that Mr. Parks “ended the state’s investigation” (Respondent’s Brief, p. 18) is 
unsupported by any document in the record or any explanation of what the State would have 
investigated had the case not settled. The timeline of the case combined with the State’s conduct 
in this post-conviction case suggest that no actual prejudice occurred. 
9. 
It is inaccurate to describe Dr. Arden’s testimony as mere impeachment. His testimony was 
material substantive evidence which would have cast substantial doubt on the core of the 
State’s murder and arson charges against Mr. Parks. 
The State inaccurately characterizes Dr. Arden’s testimony as “potential impeachment 
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evidence” (Respondent’s Brief, p. 19) and as “merely impeaching” (Respondent’s Brief, p. 22) of 
Dr. Reynolds’s statements that the cause of death of Sarah Parks was either strangulation or 
suffocation. The State’s effort appears to be to marginalize the importance of Dr. Arden’s 
testimony to the defense which could easily have been mounted on behalf of Mr. Parks. The 
State’s argument erroneously conflates impeachment evidence with substantive evidence. 
Before discussing the difference between impeachment evidence and substantive 
evidence, it is helpful to particularly describe what is impeachment evidence. Importantly, for 
one of the classic methods of impeachment, i.e., impeachment by contradiction, there is a 
necessary overlap with substantive evidence.  
“There are five recognized methods to impeach witnesses. Three involve casting doubt on 
his word in general, and two others focus on particular errors or falsehoods in his testimony.” C. 
Mueller and L. Kirkpatrick, EVIDENCE § 6.18, p. 483 (Wolters Kluwer 5th Ed. 2012). The first 
three methods are showing bias, defect in mental or sensory capacity, and disposition or 
character for untruthfulness. Id. The latter two methods are impeachment by prior inconsistent 
statements and impeachment by contradiction. Id. at § 6.18, p. 484. Impeachment by 
contradiction includes adducing testimony from a second witness to show “that something [the 
first witness] said was wrong.” Id. “Specific contradiction, another method of impeachment, is 
based on the inference that if a witness makes a mistake about one fact, his or her testimony 
about another fact may be untrustworthy.” J. Imwinkelried, et al., COURTROOM CRIMINAL 
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EVIDENCE, § 714, p. 271 (Lexis Law Publishing 3d Ed., 1998). 
No specific rule governs impeachment by contradiction; rather, it is regulated by the 
broad mandate of evidence rules 403 and 611. Id. (addressing the Federal Rules of Evidence 
which are similar to the Idaho Rules of Evidence on these points). “Impeachment by 
contradiction is a recognized mode of impeachment not governed by Rule 608(b), but by 
common-law principles.” U.S. v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal citation 
and following citation omitted). “The rule [IRE 608(b)] must be read carefully. It is important 
not only for what it says but also for what it does not say.” State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 40, 752 
P.2d 632, 642 (Ct.App. 1993) (Burnett, J., specially concurring). As will be discussed further 
below, Dr. Arden’s testimony impeached the affidavit and deposition testimony of Dr. Reynolds 
by contradicting Dr. Reynolds on the ultimate conclusion to be drawn from the autopsy of Sarah 
Parks (i.e., strangulation or suffocation) as well as by contradicting Dr. Reynolds on whether 
medical science supported the other conclusions Dr. Reynolds drew from the evidence (e.g., 
blistering of the skin). There was certainly additional contradiction, but these examples are 
sufficient to show how Dr. Arden’s testimony was both impeaching and substantive. 
Because impeachment by contradiction generally involves the presentation of another 
witness to provide contrary factual testimony, there is often an inherent overlap between 
impeachment by contradiction and the presentation of substantive evidence. “Evidence may be 
both substantive and impeaching.” State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 74, 253 P.3d 727, 748 (2011) 
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(citation omitted). 
Substantive evidence is offered to help prove a fact which is of consequence to the 
litigation. As to the distinction between impeachment evidence and substantive evidence, the 
Ellington Court held, “Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of 
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which the determination of the 
tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to 
reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which explains why the 
jury should not put faith in him or his testimony.” Id. (citation omitted). 
In the case at bar, the victim’s cause of death was one of the central issues in the case. 
Evidence regarding how Sarah Parks died was undoubtedly material. “Black's Law Dictionary 
defines ‘material evidence’ as that evidence ‘[h]aving some logical connection with the 
consequential facts.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 74, 253 P.3d at 748 (citation omitted). When Dr. 
Arden testified that the cause of death of Sarah Parks should have been stated as “undetermined” 
because of the absence of evidence on which to make a conclusion, he was providing substantive 
evidence that Sarah Parks was not killed by Silas Parks while at the same time impeaching Dr. 
Reynolds’s testimony by contradicting it. These contradictions were detailed in part in 
Appellants Brief pp. 12-16.  
For considerations of length, not every contradiction or criticism of Dr. Reynolds’s 
techniques and conclusions which Dr. Arden detailed in his testimony at the evidentiary hearing 
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was repeated in Mr. Parks’s opening brief. For instance, twice Dr. Arden cited and quoted from 
learned treatises to discredit the autopsy report drafted by Dr. Reynolds. See Trans., pp. 83-90. 
Dr. Arden’s testimony was not rebutted by any expert at the evidentiary hearing. Dr. Arden also 
testified regarding the absence of evidence of injury to Silas Parks which could be expected from 
a homicide caused by one person within arm’s reach of another. See Tr., p. 90, L. 25 - p. 94, L. 
22. Even though it has never been Silas Parks’s burden to prove in court how Sarah Parks died, 
Dr. Arden also testified that a blow to the head could not be ruled out as a possible cause of 
death, nor could a “cardiac event.” Tr., p. 94, L. 23 - p. 96, L. 17. 
The thrust of Dr. Arden’s testimony was not mere nitpicking of Dr. Reynolds’s autopsy 
report nor was it, as the State asserts, “merely impeaching” (Respondent’s Brief, p. 22). It was 
critical evidence undercutting the central premise of the State’s murder case against Mr. Parks: 
that he either strangled her or suffocated her. By undercutting the murder case, the forensic 
testimony offered by the defense would also have undercut the arson case against Mr. Parks 
because there was no motive for the arson other than to cover up the alleged murder. Defense 
counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to investigate this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and previously set forth in Mr. Parks’s opening brief on 
appeal, this Court should hold that the District Court erred in dismissing the petition for post-
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conviction relief both by incorrectly applying the Strickland standard and by failing to vacate the 
convictions pursuant to the plain language of I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4); reverse the District Court’s 
final judgment dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief; hold that the Rule 11 plea 
agreement in State of Idaho v. Silas B. Parks, Latah County Case No. CR 2009-03162, must be 
rescinded and that the guilty pleas entered by the Petitioner in that matter pursuant to the plea 
agreement must be set aside; and remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with those holdings. 
DATED this 19th day of August 2017. 
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